by Daniel Tippens
[Note from the Editor-in-Chief: beginning with this post we will begin to implement an updated policy for commenting. The relevant bit is as follows: “The Editors at Scientia Salon do their best to keep the dialogue both civil and productive. This means that we do not hesitate to reject an unsuitable comment, either because it is offensive or because it is not understandable by a general audience, grossly incorrect, or largely off topic. Whenever that happens, the author of the comment is alerted to the fact and allowed to resubmit a modified version of it, if s/he so wishes.”]
Many define philosophy by both its subject matter and its method. The subject matter (epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, etc.) is what much of Scientia Salon attempts to bring to Main Street through essays, book reviews, and interviews. However, if the subject matter were the only thing fostered, half of what characterizes philosophy would be left out — the method. What follows attempts to foster this other half.
What is the method of philosophy?
As broadly speaking as possible, the method of (analytic) philosophy is clear argumentation and use of the tools that make an argument successful. Success, here, is the acquisition of true propositions and the rejection of false ones. Those tools that make an argument successful are critical thinking, logic, and other reasoning skills. Let’s include these all under the umbrella term of “critical thinking” for now.
What the tractor is to an agricultural farmer, critical thinking is to a philosopher. Yes, it is true that most other fields employ critical thinking as well, but many go so far as to say that philosophy is critical thinking “on crack.” Since critical thinking is the crucial pillar of philosophical practice, philosophers not only master its use, but spend time improving on what good critical thinking is. One reflection of this is perhaps the fact that Philosophy majors tend to score very high on standardized tests like the LSATs, which demand honed critical thinking skills. Such skills are on a hair-trigger for the philosopher.
In addition to the benefit philosophers find in employing critical thinking in terms of constructing good arguments, there is both pragmatic and intrinsic value in developing good critical thinking skills and clear argumentation skills. Not only can these skills be applied to almost any practical decision making problem one may encounter, refining these skills and employing them is a pleasurable activity in and of itself.
We want to make Scientia Salon the best possible forum for good quality intellectual exchange, and therefore for exercising our writers’ and readers’ critical thinking. What follows, then, is a compilation of what some bad habits of thinking and arguing that the editorial staff at SciSal has found to be common in the comment threads at the magazine. Our analysis is meant as a set of tips to keep in mind while continuing SciSal’s dialogue between the Ivory Tower and Main Street, hopefully making everyone’s experience on this site of even higher quality than it already is.
Epistemic sadism
This takes place when an interlocutor operates merely at the level of factoid disputes. Often, such interlocutor seems to simply take pleasure in factually correcting another, regardless of how much (or whether) this advances discourse.
Example:
Interlocutor A: Perhaps it is the case that what we are phenomenally conscious of is more than what we have access to (can attend to and report on). Consider this argument X.
Epistemic Sadist: Science has shown that we are not phenomenally conscious of more than we can attend to. Your view is outdated.
Here, the epistemic sadist has ignored argument X and simply stated that interlocutor A is factually incorrect. He has not deployed actual critical thinking in his response to interlocutor A. Had he shown how argument X is unsound due to scientific conclusions this would be constructive, but as it stands he has not done so.
Abouting
Someone is “abouting” when they hide an argument for a conclusion under the term “about,” or they use “about” ambiguously such that their conclusion either trivially follows or is false. Consider the following cases:
Hidden argument case:
Suppose my friend has unexpectedly impregnated his girlfriend and is ambivalent about staying around to support the child. I tell him: “This decision isn’t about you, it is all about the baby, so you have to stick around to support it.”
Here the implicit argument (or something like it) is that what ought to determine your decision is what action of yours will be best for the baby. Since it would be best for the baby for its father to be around, my friend ought to stick around to support it. This argument can be challenged, but it is harder to do so when it is not explicitly stated and is hidden under the term “about.”
Ambiguity case:
Two people are discussing whether or not scientists are experts on topics discussed in philosophy of science. Someone says: “Science is all about philosophy of science, so scientists are obviously experts on the subject.”
If “science is all about philosophy of science” means that scientists are practicing the methods that philosophers of science are questioning the purpose of (do the methods get at the way the world is or simply predictive success?), then it is trivially true, but it does not warrant the conclusion that scientists are experts on the philosophy of science.
If “science is all about philosophy of science” means that scientists are frequently thinking about, and publishing papers on, whether or not scientific methods can tell us something concerning the way the world is vs. mere predictive success, then the claim that “science is about philosophy of science” is clearly false, and does not warrant the conclusion that scientists are experts on the philosophy of science.
Rathering
This is a term taken from Daniel Dennett’s Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. Someone is “rathering” when they claim, “it’s not the case that X. Rather, Y is true.”
Here, one has made it look as though they have made an argument for Y, but really they have not. Additionally, they may have committed a false dichotomy — it could be that case that both Y and X are true.
Example:
“The problem of free will is not a metaphysical problem about whether or not free will exists. Rather, it is a semantic problem about what we mean by the term free will.”
Here, we see “rathering” because there has been no argument for the claim that the problem of free will is merely a semantic problem. We have only seen two assertions: that there is no metaphysical problem of free will, and that there is only a semantic problem of free will. Additionally, it could be the case that there is both a metaphysical problem of free will and a semantic problem of free will. So, it is possible that a false dichotomy has been created.
Humpty Dumpty semantics
This is when somebody decides to redefine a term arbitrarily, thereby neglecting the reasons we employ certain terms to begin with: to make useful conceptual distinctions, or reflect the way we use language for practical purposes. This can either be by broadening a definition, or by changing a definition completely.
Example 1: Making useful conceptual distinctions
Just as one billiard ball causes another billiard ball to move when one strikes the other, so too 1+1 “causes” 2 when the axioms of the mathematical system in question make this the case.
Sometimes we use our terms to help us make useful conceptual distinctions. Regarding this example, we think that the physical relation of causality that obtains is different from the “causal” relation between mathematical statements. For example, that one physical event causes another is a contingent truth in the world (something that didn’t logically have to obtain, but it just so happens that in our world it did), whereas 1+1 “causes” 2 is a necessary truth (something that is true in all possible worlds, that we couldn’t imagine being false), one that follows deductively from a set of axioms. Broadening definitions arbitrarily doesn’t respect one of the reasons we use terms: to make useful conceptual distinctions. Additionally, it would fail to make clear what the obvious differences are between the two senses of “causality.”
Example 2: Reflecting the way we talk for practical purposes
“Science is anything that employs observation, reasoning, and critical thinking to draw conclusions.”
Sometimes we have practical reasons for defining terms the way we do. One can choose to define “science” in this broad way, but it wouldn’t reflect the way that the term is ordinarily used (to pick out an enterprise that performs systematic observations or well-controlled experiments and publishes results in scientific journals). Additionally, it would be pragmatically harmful to define “science” this way, as it would collapse the distinction between pseudoscience and science, which are things we want to distinguish for practical purposes: to advise against employing one vs. the other.
Happy commenting!
_____
Dan Tippens is Assistant Editor at Scientia Salon. He received his Bachelors of Arts in Philosophy at New York University. He is now a research technician at New York University School of Medicine in the S. Arthur Localio Laboratory.
Scientia Salon 
Hi Dan,
Nice essay and much to agree with, although as is my usual practice I will focus on points of contention.
On whether philosophers are expert critical thinkers, it seems to me that one can also make a successful career of philosophy by engaging in clever sophistry. One need only point out that there are professional philosophers who are adamant that other philosophers are failing to think critically or talking nonsense (for example Massimo’s views on David Chalmers). Unfortunately which philosophers actually are thinking critically and which are talking nonsense seems to be an impossible question to settle, making me suspicious of the claim that philosophers should be assumed to be expert critical thinkers (although some clearly are).
I’m mostly with you on abouting, although I do think that many scientists do discuss and think about questions pertaining to philosophy of science, so the claim that many scientists have some expertise on philosophy of science is plausible to me. Also, as with an Amazon tribesperson who may have a certain level of authority on Amazon tribespeople to which a Western academic anthropologist ought in some cases to defer, so scientists have a certain authority arising out of their special perspective.
I disagree with you on rathering in many cases, and I think I can illustrate why with some rathering of my own. It ought not be assumed that instances of rathering are intended to be complete arguments, rather they are often intended to simply state an alternative point of view, and in this case they are perfectly valid. Often the mere existence of this other way of looking at things is enough to undermine the original assumption and constitutes the essence of a compelling argument, and I personally feel this is the case with your free will example.
I would agree with Dennett that sometimes rathering is misused, but I think it is very often used as a perfectly legitimate and useful argumentative tool.
I think Humpty Dumpty semantics are in the eye of the beholder. For instance, I think causation in the physical world arises ultimately out of mathematical entailment, where the laws of physics and the initial conditions are really no different from axioms in a mathematical system. This is not a case of humpty semantics eliding the differences between causation and entailment, it is a stronger claim that ultimately they turn out to be equivalent. Sometimes we want to broaden definitions because we really do reject the conceptual distinctions that others perceive.
> Additionally, it would be pragmatically harmful to define “science” this way, as it would collapse the distinction between pseudoscience and science
Those who want to define “science” broadly should be interpreted as talking about adopting the essence of the scientific method for finding truth in other domains (e.g. finding the leak in a plumbing system or debugging a computer program). Pseudoscience is excluded from such a definition because the reasoning, observation and thinking is faulty in some way.
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Terrific piece. Excellent identification of problems that have become very common around here and which are making productive discourse difficult. Well-written, too, with really good examples.
I’m not sure I quite understood the “rathering” problem, though. From the way it’s written, it sounds like it would exclude the type of analysis of philosophical problems offerd by the later Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and Gilbert Ryle. Ryle, for example, says exactly this regarding the mind/body problem — i.e. that it involves a category mistake, in our use of mentalistic and physicalistic vocabularies. Could you, perhaps, clarify?
This is just a nit-pick though. The new guidelines are great. I remain impressed with how Scientia sees problems and adapts itself to account for them.
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DM wrote:
“I think Humpty Dumpty semantics are in the eye of the beholder.”
—————————————————
There’s a reason why Lewis Caroll — a logician — included this section in “Through the Looking Glass.” Humpty Dumpty Semantics represents a basic misunderstanding of how language works. In this, he was ahead of his time. The original generation of philosophers of language came to the subject through mathematics and logic — i.e. from the perspective of artifical languages — in which definitions are stipulative and admit of neat necessary and sufficient conditions. It wouldn’t be until the Ordinary Language tradition, the later Wittgenstein, H.P. Grice, and John Searle that philosophers of language would be disabused of this mistake. Artifical languages are very much *unlike* natural languages and provide a very poor model for understanding them.
That Humpty Dumpty semantics represent a basic mistake is no longer disputed, in the philosophy of language. It is hardly “in the eye of the beholder.” At least not anymore. That does not mean that there aren’t any terms that are defined stipulatively — but they are not the sorts of terms that we commonly wrangle about here, in S.S.
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Hi Aravis,
> I’m not sure I quite understood the “rathering” problem, though.
As I mentioned in my comment, this bothered me a bit too.
I’ve since gone to try and find out what Dennett was talking about, and I think he is much more concerned about the smuggling in of a false dichotomy than he is about the appearance of having given an argument without actually doing so.
So, for Dennett at least, problematic rathering is statements such as “A dog is not a carnivore, rather it is a mammal”, which falsely implies without explicitly stating it that something cannot be both a carnivore and a mammal at the same time.
Dennett is apparently clear that many instances of “Something is not X, rather it is Y” are perfectly reasonable.
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Aravis, DM,
the “rathering” problem is a real one, but yes, there are legitimate situations in which people engage in category mistakes, in which case the “rathering” move is actually legitimate. Dan, Phil and I will look carefully at those cases and come up with the best, most fair judgment we can arrive at.
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Hi Aravis,
> That Humpty Dumpty semantics represent a basic mistake is no longer disputed, in the philosophy of language. It is hardly “in the eye of the beholder.”
I’m not disputing it either. I am saying that which particular instances constitute a genuine Humpty Dumpty mistake is in the eye of the beholder.
If you are of the view that X and Y are fundamentally different, then any conflation of X and Y by means of redefining terms is a Humpty Dumpty mistake.
If you are of the view that X and Y are fundamentally the same, then this is not so.
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Just my suggestion: It would be better if both the essays and comments were shorter; sometimes, much shorter. Too many long-winded ones that deviate from one or a very few critical points.
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Massimo (and DM, Aravis) the rathering problem is simple enough to me. It’s countering one assertion with another assertion, without either trying to disprove the first, or prove the second. The key issue is that both are bald assertions without attempt at proof.
(For my proof, I cite Tippens, Essay 033115, loc cit. — ratio circulonis.)
That said, if I may pick one nit and presumably not run afoul of the tighter commenting rules for allegedly attacking a factoid — under “rathering,” both assertions could be false just as much as both could be true, and then, you have rathering being compounded with other issues.
Indeed, I think that’s the meta-issue that lies behind much “rathering” — the proponent not only makes no effort to prove the second statement, the second statement itself has problems, whether being untrue, nonprovable, poorly defined, etc.
Juxtaposing legitimate category mistakes with this, I normally call a category mistake a category mistake in my comments here. In fact, I may use it broadly enough to creep into the edges of the “rathering.”
I think intent of the proposer is what’s at issue; with “rathering,” I think part of that intent is simply to avoid the philosophical argument as presented, without regard to present a sound counterargument, let alone show why the counterargument is valid. With a category mistake, rather, it’s issues of definitions. That said, some category mistakes can be based on Ye Olde Overton Window, and we shouldn’t forget that.
Philip Per previous installation of commentary rules, I would surrender length (barring a unilateral decision by Massimo) only in exchange for the right to make at least one additional comment. I would surrender both if essays were shorter.
That said, do you really want essays under 2,000 words, let alone, say, under 1,700? If some current essays are more turgid than others, I’d rather critique writing or argumentation style that makes them read “longer” rather than cut the length in general.
==
Otherwise, I too think the new commenting guidelines are good in general, and look forward to seeing them play out.
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Pointing out bad habits in arguing? Excellent! Let’s join in.
Fallacy: Putting forward a claim that has not been made, and refuting it, as though that refutes similar claims that have actually been made.
Example: Someone might say:
… as though someone had actually said that. Now, the more likely claim would be about (let’s phrase this neutrally) the “nature of science”.
Group A pursue science every day, and in order to do science well they need a fair amount of understanding of the nature of science and how it works. Further, because they care a lot about science they think quite a bit about the nature of science.
Group B are not scientists, and so don’t have a hands-on feel for science. But they do discuss the “nature of science” among themselves, and come to conclusions agreed among themselves about the “nature of science”.
Fallacy: members of Group B obviously know much more about the “nature of science” than members of Group A, because they say so, therefore any discussion can be settled by simply referring to what Group B think, and so it needn’t be actually argued.
Related fallacy: Since Group A and Group B are largely different communities, they tend to have different ideas about the “nature of science” and use terms differently, therefore Group A are the ones doing it wrong.
On another topic:
Fallacy: Quibbling about language in order to avoid dealing with the actual point being made.
Example, someone might say:
The reason for a broad definition is likely to be about epistemology. The claim would be that the same rules of evidence and reason apply to many fields in the same way that they do to science. For example, if one considers the past history of humans, there is no point where, on a certain morning, at half past eight, the fundamental rules of evidence and reason abruptly change. Therefore the “science” of pre-history and the “humanity” of history are much the same thing, epistemologically, though for pragmatic reasons they may have big differences of style.
Fallacy: replying to that claim by “well, “science” and “history” are done in different university buildings, therefore they’re not the same thing” (which is a non sequitur), or “that’s not the normal usage of the word “science”, therefore the claim is wrong”, as though the claimant doesn’t already know that, or as though a quibble about terminology refutes the wider point.
Related fallacy: “… it would collapse the distinction between pseudoscience and science …”. No it wouldn’t, since that distinction is about *quality* of argument and evidence, it is not about subject area.
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My sympathies go out to the moderators. I don’t envy the task you’ve set yourselves, with this crowd.
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Aravis, that’s why we drink martinis together…
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It seems to me that most of these examples might be okay, it’s just that they are underdeveloped. You would need to go on to either provide evidence, or show why they apply. What you are really saying, broadly, is that you won’t be satisfied with argument by assertion, not that assertions of these kinds are necessarily invalid.
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DM,
“For instance, I think causation in the physical world arises ultimately out of mathematical entailment, where the laws of physics and the initial conditions are really no different from axioms in a mathematical system.”
I cannot even imagine a possible world in which interpretation of regularities in physical phenomena could be no different from postulates in specialized linguistic systems. That there’s a stronger claim behind this assertion, that they ‘turn out to be equivalent’ (which just restates the assertion with emphasis), doesn’t clarify the difficulty here.
“Sometimes we want to broaden definitions because we really do reject the conceptual distinctions that others perceive.”
Yes, but; one can only do this by first acknowledging definitions and distinctions that are generally understood. Re-inventing language to satisfy one’s own perspective will not do.
Here is a central problem that these new guidelines are attempting to address. There is no doubt that there are many special terms, and definitions of terms, used in professional fields of discourse. An instance I well remember from graduate school: The term ‘deconstruction’ has disseminated out from the academy to the point where it is used by people who have never heard of Derrida (and wouldn’t like him if they did). In common usage, it is largely a synonym for ‘dismantling,’ which was assuredly not Derrida’s intent.
What this means in practice, in the context of the kind of discussion we have here, is that if I use the word loosely, as in, say, ‘to deconstruct a house, we’ll need the proper tools,’ I should assume that my readers will take the term in its common language usage. If on the other hand I write ‘we should deconstruct “House MD” as a series of metaphors for contemporary politics,’ then I should be prepared to explain that as a critical practice derived from the work of Derrida, when confusions arise. (Responding to complaints with ‘everyone familiar with Continental philosophy knows what I mean’ seems uncharitable.)
The one move sure to lead to discursive impasse is something like, asserting: ‘deconstructing “House MD” is like building a house, in that all the parts nonetheless fit together’ – where ‘deconstruction’ is used in a novel way, possibly referring to an epistemic claim on part-whole relationships in an as yet incomplete meta-theory of structure. Defending this usage by claiming ‘this is how I define the term’ is empty. Insisting ‘once you see it my way, it becomes clear,’ is unpersuasive. Attempting to elaborate the meta-theory in the space of a short comment here is futile. At best one can write, ‘but see my blog/book/paper/etc.’ where the theory is actually elaborated.
Some commenters here at SS seem bent on using the site to elaborate just such theories or meta-theories. Sometimes remarks in these elaborations can be challenging or informative; but too frequently they read as rambling manifestos: rarely on-topic, often unclear, sometimes disruptive. They beg for modification; hopefully these guidelines will move them in that direction.
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All,
Just to make it clear, I don’t think we will be rejecting a comment immediately because it contains one of these problems within it. These, as the introduction to the list of habits said, are just general tips to keep in mind that, if respected, would allow for much more enjoyable discussion here at SS.
Cervantes,
What you said is basically correct. The only thing I would add is that the reason we characterized these tendencies and gave them labels is because they are particularly psychologically persuasive, very frequently employed here on SS, and make productive discourse especially difficult.
DM,
As usual, I appreciate your thoughts. I only want to say that this post wasn’t primarily intended to make any claims or well-constructed arguments, I really just wanted to illustrate some tendencies that are *generally* bad. I agree with you that in some cases all of these “bad habits” can be permissible, but we rarely see those acceptable cases here on SS.
Socratic,
“issue that lies behind much “rathering” — the proponent not only makes no effort to prove the second statement, the second statement itself has problems, whether being untrue, nonprovable, poorly defined, etc.”
“I think intent of the proposer is what’s at issue; with “rathering,” I think part of that intent is simply to avoid the philosophical argument as presented, without regard to present a sound counterargument, let alone show why the counterargument is valid.”
Yes, thank you for saying this so clearly.
Aravis,
I also agree that there is room for “rathering” when used properly, my suspicion is just that it gets used too frequently on SS in the way Socratic elaborated on above.
Coel,
This post was simply intended to point out some bad habits in arguing, not to challenge your views in detail. I’m sure there will be a time and a place to discuss the issues you brought up.
One last thing though, you said, “Related fallacy: “… it would collapse the distinction between pseudoscience and science …”. No it wouldn’t, since that distinction is about *quality* of argument and evidence, it is not about subject area.”
This isn’t a fallacy, this is you arguing why a proposition is false. Also please see the editorial advice against “abouting” once again.
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Hi Dan,
Thanks, I see where you’re coming from and I just want to be clear that I welcome the article and the effort to improve comment quality.
Hi ejwinner,
> I cannot even imagine a possible world in which interpretation of regularities in physical phenomena could be no different from postulates in specialized linguistic systems.
And I don’t propose to explain it here (though I know you’ve read my article on the MUH so you should have some idea where I’m coming from). The point as it pertains to this topic is that sometimes what appears to be a tactic designed to confuse or mislead may arise out of a very different world view where two things that are self-evidently completely different to you are seen as two sides of the same coin to someone else.
> Yes, but; one can only do this by first acknowledging definitions and distinctions that are generally understood. Re-inventing language to satisfy one’s own perspective will not do.
It’s not necessarily a re-inventing of language. It may be the case that there is a word X which we use in context A and a word Y which we use in context B. If you think contexts A and B are fundamentally the same, any differences being illusory or unimportant, then may be correct to say something like X is a special case of Y or Xs and Ys are the same thing or so on. This ought to be understood as a claim (which may need backing up), not a redefinition of terms.
For instance, the claim that videogames (or programming or politics or whatever) are a legitimate artform can be interpreted as an unhelpful broadening of the scope of the word “art” or as a claim that there is no important difference between (e.g.) the domain of games and the domains more traditionally associated with art. Whether this is a Humpty Dumpty redefinition of language or a meaningful claim depends on your point of view regarding the putative artform.
> Some commenters here at SS seem bent on using the site to elaborate just such theories or meta-theories.
I am probably one of these. In my defence, my views on different topics can’t easily be ring-fenced from one another. I often only feel a particular way about something because of how this intersects with my views on something else. If challenged to justify myself, I may need to bring in functionalism or Platonism or even (unfortunately) the MUH. While I agree that some commentators here do veer into their pet topics too often for no good reason, I think it’s fair to allow a reasonable amount of leeway whenever relevance can be somewhat justified.
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Hi Massimo, Daniel (et al),
So I am a little confused and I am hoping for some clarification. This post announces that from here on out a comment will not be published if the editors deem that “it is offensive or because it is not understandable by a general audience, grossly incorrect, or largely off topic”. I have no problem with this new guideline. However the post that follows outlines some complex and ambiguous matters in critical thinking. It claims to do this in an attempt to “foster” good philosophical methodology.
My question is whether the editors wish to “foster” good methodology by outlining these good habits and periodically reminding commentors of them or by enforcing them as guidelines and not allowing comments deemed, by the editors, to be engaged in “humpty-dumpty semantics” to be published. I think the latter course would be unfortunate. Coel is no doubt right to see something of himself in the views that are singled out for dispraise. SciSal came into existence, in large part, because such views as Coel’s have become surprisingly commonplace and offers a place to freely debate them. Hence gerrymandering the other side out of the conversation strikes me as a significant betrayal of the spirit of the enterprise (if that is what the editors have in mind I am genuinely asking). Coel and others have also made good faith attempts to motivate their argumentative moves and use of vocabularies as well. Hence Coel will typically say he is not just arbitrarily defining terms, in a “humpty-dumpty” maneuver, but is defining them in ways that reflect typical scientific usage. These motivations strike me as, at the end of the day, inadequate but they are made and made in good faith. Hence I do not think the charge of “humpty-dumpty semantics” is such a slam-dunk that it should prevent the comments from being published. These charges should be debated openly in the comment section and readers should be allowed to make up their own minds.
Further I think there has been an unjustifiably gloomy attitude about public discourse around SciSal of late. The last few posts have been highly technical and difficult and I know I have had a hard time crafting adequate responses as have, I think, others. Perhaps the comments were not all that everyone had hoped for. However I think that will turn around as new posts come in that fall more in our various wheel-houses. It has also been noted that we frequently debate the same topics and the most frequently seen commentors on SciSal do not seem to change their minds. This is of course true but it is important to remember that more people read than comment. Many hear the scientistic kind of arguments made by a Krauss or an NDT in the foot-ball arena type atmosphere that passes for intellectual discussion nowadays without ever hearing the response from the other side. SciSal at least allows people to see responses and rebuttals from both sides and even engage in the discussion themselves. And better yet, SciSal stands up for the kind of polite and through thinking in what Hume called “the calm, reflective hour”. I continue to have faith that this will be of considerable value.
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David,
good questions. And it is actually rather ironic that Coel finds so much fault with the new policy, since he has been one of a number of people pushing for precisely this kind of change… Nonetheless, I think we are going to try to do both things you outlined:
a) we will soon republish Dan’s essay as a permanent new tab on the main SciSal site, as a general reminder of the points made, and we will offer occasional pointers and suggestions throughout the ongoing discussion threads;
but b) we will also reject *clearly* off topic or incomprehensible (to us) comments, on the ground that they do not further, and in fact positively hamper, SciSal’s mission of public discourse.
Rest assured that in each case the author of the comment will be contacted and a (brief) explanation will be provided, together with an offer to resubmit a modified version of the comment.
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I can understand the moderators trying to manage the debate and various comments point out some of these methods are legitimate in some circumstances, but not in others. Like a lot of things, drawing the line can be a little fuzzy and subjective. While it is always nice to have clear and straightforward arguments, the nature of the debate is not always so obliging. Sometimes one can have a point and not be able to express it clearly, or they might well just be making stuff up. Sometimes a response might also be based on genuine disagreements, but not argued effectively and sometimes it might be a more emotional consideration that draws a negative response. This is why humans make better moderators than algorithms. As that famous old comment about pornography by a Supreme Court justice put it; I know it when I see it.
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David, your point regarding readers versus commentators is more than fair. That said, I will tell you that I am one of those folks who has become less inclined to read Scientia, because of Humpty Dumptyism — as well as some of the other tactics described in the post — and as I have indicated, I will not contribute essays, because of the constant denigrating and insulting of disciplinary philosophy and philosophers that comes from certain quarters. And I am not the only one. I have spoken to a number of people who have stopped reading and who will never contribute, for similar reasons. That is bad for a site that wants professional philosophers to submit their work.
So, I view the situation differently — more gloomily — than you do, and I disagree that many of the things you describe are done in good faith. My perception, rather, is that they are done in the spirit of soapboxing and propagandizing. Indeed, I think that the editors are Scientia are proceeding in an exceedingly moderate, even conservative fashion. I simply would have banned a number of folks outright, as would many others, if put in a similar position. The editors are to be commended for taking this noble approach, one that is hardly required, given that this is not a public street corner, but a privately-owned blog.
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DM,
“The point as it pertains to this topic is that sometimes what appears to be a tactic designed to confuse or mislead may arise out of a very different world view where two things that are self-evidently completely different to you are seen as two sides of the same coin to someone else.”
But the problem is not simply a matter of two individual perspectives. There are common language understandings of terms, and there are technical understandings of certain terms. Where the technical understanding is somehow in conflict with the common language understanding, this conflict must be clarified so that we can discuss the matter on the same basis. And there is a further difficulty when pressing to enlarge the envelope on the technical understanding, in that even those familiar with the technical understanding may be bewildered with what appears to be a novel usage. At that point a case has to be made, and I’m not sure that such a case can be properly made in the comments here.
So I’m not denying your viewpoint; I’m saying that your viewpoint is expressed in a manner that conflicts not only with my common language understanding of the terms, but with at least many of the technical understandings I’ve learned studying philosophy (and what little I’ve picked up reading science). The question then comes down to how we can clarify our disagreements within a community of discourse.
These are basic rhetorical considerations. When addressing an audience publicly, one always must keep the audience first in mind, or one ends up thinking out loud, to no one’s benefit.
The issue about video-games is actually to the point. There is in fact a sub-genre of contemporary literary theory and cultural studies that has been making that case for at least 20 years. But the theorists in that field do not simply assume they are in the know and that nay-sayers just don’t get it; they have been developing strategic arguments and rhetorical tactics to publish in peer-reviewed journals, present at conferences, etc., so that the discourse can be shared by ever larger communities. In other words, they have kept their audience in mind when discussing their theories, and this is entirely appropriate.
So the question may be boiling down to, are the comment threads on SS the appropriate forum for novel theories? I think that these can be remarked here, but elaborate argument on such matters seem doomed to failure.
“> Some commenters here at SS seem bent on using the site to elaborate just such theories or meta-theories.
I am probably one of these.”
This was a general remark; actually I’ve rarely felt this about your comments.
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Dan,
Pardon my brief reappearance but I think it is apposite that I momentarily reincarnate and say something about this important subject.
While I think your point about faulty argumentation is good and well argued, I think it needs to be supplemented by rules that reflect good practice in commentary. Below is my attempt at formulating a dodecalogue that represents good practice. I hope that my comment satisfies the twelfth commandment(below).
The Twelve Commandments of Commentary.
1. The first rule of commenting is first attend to the central issue of the essay. The author has something important to say. Recognise this by replying constructively to the central theme.
2. The second rule of commenting is to make a serious effort to thoroughly understand the essay. Daniel Dennett put it this way … http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=8877
3. The third rule of commenting is to keep the conversation mainly directed at the essay author and not at other commentators.
4. The fourth rule of commenting is related to the second rule. Desist from contradicting other commentators. The essay is not a place for commentators to engage in personal warfare against other commentators. If you want to say something to another commentator look for a thoughtful and constructive way to do it.
5. The fifth rule of commenting is that of goodwill. If you think someone else’s comment really deserves a reply, do it in a thoughtful spirit of goodwill. Zingers, barbs, caustic remarks, blunt contradictions, irony, sarcasm, are all examples of things that contradict the spirit of goodwill.
6. The sixth rule of commenting is to look for points of agreement and acknowledge them. This builds bridges and enables respectful debate.
7. The seventh rule of commenting is to demonstrates your willingness to recognise other points of view. This shows your flexibility and thoughtfulness.
8. The eighth rule of commenting is that of charity. Make charitable assumptions about the other person’s intent and beliefs.
9. The ninth rule of commenting is that of ideology. Do not frame every discussion through the lens of your dominant ideology. Allow space for other points of view to be considered.
10. The tenth rule of commenting is that of respect. Respect for the author of the essay by carefully considering and replying to his essay. Respect for other commentators in the thoughtful way you engage with them.
11. The eleventh rule of commenting is to let go. Make your point and allow others the right of reply. If you have fashioned your comment carefully it does not need follow-ons.
12. The twelfth and final rule of commenting is that you should at all times be constructive. Was your comment informative? Will others find it useful? Did it enrich the debate? The golden rule is this – will others, especially the silent majority, recognise your comment as a constructive contribution?
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Labnut, thank you for posting these. I find them highly helpful and informative.
Also just to be clear, we do plan on keeping on the lookout for *good* habits of argumentation and critical thinking that make the discussion on SS much more enjoyable. we just haven’t done this yet.
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Re: “the constant denigrating and insulting of disciplinary philosophy and philosophers”
(Scratching my head.) Is that true? Maybe I’ve missed something. I’ve read the essays and comments for some time now, and it seems that most is content that directly references philosophers and writings by philosophers. They may have different or even contradicting vocabularies and frameworks, though.
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Philip:
You left out the last part of my sentence: “…that comes from certain quarters.”
I am talking about a few people. Yet, a few people is all you need to create an unpleasant environment for someone, who might otherwise have thought about contributing.
If, after this, you are still scratching your head, I am afraid I cannot help.
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The one I wonder about is epistemic sadism. So if somebody writes that diseases are caused by evil spirits I should explain a whole experimental set-up that demonstrates why we accept the germ theory of disease? I can’t just write: you are wrong, the science is in? Now that’s going to be fun.
Coel,
Had to smile at your comment on philosophy of science! As I remarked on Rationally Speaking earlier, funny how there are no philosophers of plumbing or accounting constantly telling plumbers and accountants how they are doing it wrong. Apparently those areas are considered capable of policing their incompetent members themselves, but science isn’t…
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> funny how there are no philosophers of plumbing or accounting constantly telling plumbers and accountants how they are doing it wrong. Apparently those areas are considered capable of policing their incompetent members themselves, but science isn’t…
That’s an unfair remark. I rarely have the impression on Scientia Salon that philosophers are telling scientist how they are doing it wrong. In the comments I’m seeing many more scientists telling philosophers and other scientists how they are doing it wrong.
I do get the feeling sometimes that the tools of philosophy – conceptual analysis and all that – are not entirely adequate to capture what science does and how it works. But it would surprise me if philosophers were thinking that their tools are perfect. On the other hand, there are non-philosophers in the comment section of SS that do seem to overestimate the power of the tools of the hard sciences.
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Hi Alex,
First, please remember that these are simply helpful hints that commentators should keep in mind.
Second, the example you gave is an example where your interlocutor has said something completely non-sensical (that evil demons cause disease). In this case of course you don’t have to explain germ theory to him- because we will not let his comment through. Additionally, its clear that no standards of discourse will matter in that situation because he doesn’t “play by the rules.” Consequently, why should we play by the rules with him?
So where “epistemic sadism” applies is when somebody develops a relatively well-constructed argument and is simply responded to with something like, “science says so.” Feel free to look back through previous threads to see that this has been a problem.
Also I am not quite sure why you think philosophers of science are telling scientists they are doing things wrong.
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dantip,
There will, however, surely be disagreements about whether something is “completely non-sensical”. It seems perfectly obvious to me that Cartesian dualism and libertarian free will fall into that category; the first has precisely the same amount of scientific evidence in its favour as the demonic possession theory of disease, and libertarian free will is totally incoherent because the options are exhausted with cause-effect (no freedom) and randomness (no will). But others here disagree. That is just the problem. Where do you draw the line?
The point is that in those cases where you and Massimo personally do not consider a claim nonsensical it is still somewhat problematic to expect those who do to use their precious five comments to make a detailed case where a simple reference to the consensus of experts should be sufficient, because that would allow Gish Gallopers an easy way to win a debate by default.
Why I think philosophers of science are telling scientists they are doing things wrong? Because of lots of previous posts here and on Rationally Speaking, for example? (Note that there are obviously lots of cases where individual scientists are, indeed, doing things wrong, but that doesn’t mean that Coel doesn’t have a point about the relationship between practitioners and well-intended but sometimes naive observers of an activity.)
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Hey Alex,
“There will, however, surely be disagreements about whether something is “completely non-sensical”. It seems perfectly obvious to me that Cartesian dualism and libertarian free will fall into that category; the first has precisely the same amount of scientific evidence in its favour as the demonic possession theory of disease, and libertarian free will is totally incoherent because the options are exhausted with cause-effect (no freedom) and randomness (no will). But others here disagree. That is just the problem. Where do you draw the line?”
Yes, of course there will be a subjective element to the cutoff between nonsensical and sensical. However, this is also the case with “offensive” and “not offensive.” Sure, there will be some unclear cases that might be considered to be permissible by some and not others. Indeed, I have had to email Massimo and Phil in the past and ask for their thoughts on questionable comments.
However, just as we all feel (I hope) that the editor’s decision to filter offensive comments despite having subjectivity to the decisions, so too we will feel that the benefits from having filtering of, even though not always clear, nonsensical comments will be worth it. We hope that the overall quality of the discussion will be raised, even if there is an occasional questionable comment that slips through.
“The point is that in those cases where you and Massimo personally do not consider a claim nonsensical it is still somewhat problematic to expect those who do to use their precious five comments to make a detailed case where a simple reference to the consensus of experts should be sufficient, because that would allow Gish Gallopers an easy way to win a debate by default.”
If you feel that a comment we have let through is non-sensical, then just don’t respond to it. You don’t have to use one of your precious 5 comments to respond to somebody you think is non-sensical. Focus your comments on the commentators who you think are worth your time, or the OP. If you do think responding to someone is worth your time, we warmly suggest not simply saying something like, “science says so.” Perhaps give 2-3 sentences explaining why you feel scientific results have shown their argument to be wrong. Indeed, some people on this site are great and do just this! They will take a few sentences to explain how the science shows an argument wrong.
R.e philosophers of science: Okay, I would have to go back and look.
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Hi Massimo,
No, actually, I fully agree with the new policy, as stated in the bracketed first paragraph above. In particular I fully support the filtering of comments that are quite literally incomprehensible nonsense.
Having said that, I think that the particular set of examples of fallacies chosen by Dan is pretty dubious.
Hi Aravis,
I’m wondering, while you complain about the attitude of others to philosophy, are you aware that your general tone towards scientists is (and long has been on SS) pretty dismissive? You seem to treat it as obvious that anything a philosopher says about science automatically trumps anything a scientist says about science. You also seem to treat it as obvious that any discussion of topics of interest to both philosophers and scientists can only take place on philosophers’ terms.
Can you appreciate why others don’t see it that way? Afterall, science has a fair claim to being the most successful intellectual enterprise humans have yet achieved.
Both scientists and philosophers also need to be good at justifying and defending their subjects well beyond the world of academia and students. Scientists particularly have to do this since science is expensive (vastly more so than philosophy). Getting huffy at being asked to justify a discipline is counter-productive; it’s a fair question. Everything else gets asked the same nowadays, and it’s a major and ongoing issue for science.
Hi Dan,
Really? OK, I’ll quote from the previous thread:
“Oh, and causality is implicit in what is *meant* by an explanation, in science, …”
Note the somewhat dismissive tone, and the absence of any actual argument. Then, when Marko, a practicing scientist, disagreed, the commenter replied:
“This is stuff that can be found in basic encyclopedia entries on the subject, at Stanford and the IEP.”
The clear implication being that the *philosophical* webpages are where you go to learn what counts as explanation in science, regardless of what scientists think.
Again, there was no actual argument as to why the position Marko and/or I had stated was wrong. But there was:
“To the extent that philosophers of science have embraced conceptions of explanation that are not grounded in causality, …”
The implication there is that it is whether *philosophers* embrace non-causal explanations that matters. The possibility of scientists embracing it is not considered as relevant.
So why not use such remarks as an example of how not to argue?
Well you know, that’s exactly how I feel about many replies here, except it’s “philosophy says so”. Maybe you’re more attuned to such things when it concerns philosophy whereas I’m more attuned to them when it concerns science?
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Hi Coel,
“So why not use such remarks as an example of how not to argue?”
With all due respect to the commentator that you are discussing, I would mostly agree with you, and will say now that I also don’t think that someone should respond, “philosophy says so.”
My suspicion is that the particular commentator is simply weary from attempting to explain things to some people on this site without seeing any indication that his interlocutors listen to any of the well-developed arguments and comments he makes.
Also just to be clear, yes it is the case that scientists use explanations, but a philosopher stating what an explanation *is* is not the same thing has the philosopher telling the scientist that he is doing science wrong… He is just describing what scientists are doing when they invoke an explanation.
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We need to distinguish “Humpty Dumpty semantics” with the case where someone explicitly uses a term in a specific way for the purposes of making a specific point. In this case the obverse of Humpty Dumpty comes into play where someone goes to the dictionary and chooses one of the definitions that contradicts they way you are using it and saying, “that is what the word really means”.
I think that there should be some middle ground where someone can define “physical” in a certain way to make a point and be allowed not to mean, for example, “vigorous” by it.
Hi Coel,
I presume that it is for illustrative purposes that you spend the rest of your post doing just this.
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Alex, I hate to confirm your prejudice, but philosophers of science are, partly, in the business of pointing out to scientists when they get things wrong. Someone does need to watch the watchmen, so to speak. What makes this interesting is that, ideally, it’s a two-way conversation, and also that it doesn’t concern the technical, day to day work of scientists, but rather the epistemology, metaphysics and public presentation of science and scientific findings.
Also, about “nonsensical”: no, dualism, libertarian free will, and even p-zombies are not in that category. They may be highly debatable, or even surpassed notions, but I can make perfect sense of them. By “nonsensical” here we simply mean comments that one reads and by the end of it one scratches his head thinking “what was that all about”? I’m sure you can easily find recent examples.
Coel, Aravis et al.: about tone. Labnut’s in my mind still unjustified exit from this site is paradigmatic here. I never did promise, nor could I possibly deliver, a site were irony and even sarcasm are never used. Indeed, such a site would be pretty damn boring. This isn’t kindergarten and I’m not your stern teacher of manners. We filter only egregiously uncivil or rude comments. Making light fun of one’s science (Coel), or one’s philosophy (Aravis), or one’s religion (Labnut) does not fall into this category. While I’d rather see more substantive criticism than sarcastic remarks, the latter are by no means banned, if they are in decent enough taste, and if that’s what you expect, I suggest you simply shut off your computer and get off the internet entirely.
cheers!
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The “disagreement” between scientists and philosophers — which side is criticizing the other, and what the criticisms are — is strange to me. A Rortian pragmatist might say they just have different “vocabularies for coping”. A Rortian programmer might say they just have different “languages for coding”.
– http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism
– http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/blackburn-richard-rorty-profile
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Hi Socratic Gadfly (and Massimo et al.),
I don’t think rathering is bad at all. More broadly, I don’t think argumentation is all it is cracked up to be.
I think painting alternatives in broad brush strokes (even without argumentation) is a useful tool that allows others the opportunity to catch a glimpse of a different reality. And given a lot of recent cognitive science work, I think we can say fairly that’s a much more effective communicative tool than formal argumentation. The brain is not particularly good at being rational, and I’m not quite sure why we should prefer building a rational case before arriving at a conclusion rather than jumping to the conclusion and then retroactively trying to build the case.
If anything, I think the latter is how real progress is made the vast majority of the time.
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Meta-fallacy might be defined as noting fallacies from others, when said person has had his own fallacious reasoning pointed out. I’ll say no further, other than to reference both Massimo and David Ottlinger with their comments.
Dan, thanks for the kind words. See below for more. Per your second comment — analogies are a great way of explaining, re-explaining, or doing the written equivalent of active listening — as long as they’re not stretched too far. The Kingdom of Scientia Salon may be like a mustard seed, but is not like a fig expected to bear fruit out of season.
EJ, as he often does, has good thoughts.
“Rathering” happens in part when, to refer to Aravis’ beloved Wittgenstein (and somewhat mine too), one person says “no, that game won’t work” and follows with “we’re going to play this game instead.”
Well, first of all, per Dan, other people don’t have to agree to play the game. Second, if they do, especially since it will be, to them, a new game, they’re going to want the rules carefully stipulated in advance.
This, per EJ:
Is what I hope is addressed, at least in part.
Per discussions with Coel, sometimes the “my definition” isn’t explicit, but it still broadcasts loud and clear, like the idea that all Christians are fundamentalists. If cutting down on “rathering” is, in this Wittgensteinian sense, saying that we’re going to have the “game” of commenting here at least on a semi-regular game board, then hear, hear.
I don’t mind being “called out” myself, or by Massimo or Dan, if I have a definition that’s, to use the French, tout court. At the same time, as noted in the paragraph above, I don’t have a problem with calling out (I hope politely) others’ definitions that similarly fall short.
Per what Massimo said, a desire for such moderation I hope implies that, like game-playing, proper involvement will be a two-way street.
I otherwise think this is a relatively conservative approach.
And, speaking of Wittgenstein, I hope Massimo issues a new invitation to Aravis and he changes his mind.
AlexSL Plumbing has no metaphysical consequences; quantum mechanics does. Please note my comment above about good vs bad analogies. Otherwise, to reference Aravis, I can’t further help you.
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Massimo,
That isn’t prejudice then. I am well aware that the point of philosophy of science is to play watchmen of the watchmen (wish I could still do that in Latin, but it has been too many years now). I never disagreed with that.
But Coel has a point: The usual way this is done is that somebody who doesn’t do science tells a scientist that They Are Doing It Wrong (you, who have been both a scientist and a philosopher, are a bit of an exception here). And that is a bit of an odd situation, because in every other area the competent practitioner is the measure of doing it right. Again, you wouldn’t find some ivory tower heckler who couldn’t tell wheat from potatoes standing at the edge of a field telling the farmer that they are doing the plowing wrong. Or at least if you would, nobody would take them seriously, because everybody would quite sensibly assume that the farmer is the relevant expert here. Not so, strangely, for science.
As for nonsensical, you have quite shifted the focus now. Dan wrote that my example of demons causing illness was obvious nonsense and would be deleted, but you now write that by “nonsensical” here we simply mean comments that one reads and by the end of it one scratches his head thinking “what was that all about”? Surely we can make sense of demonic possession? And surely nobody would attempt to, or even be able to, rebut a claim that leaves one wondering what the commenter is even talking about with a reference to the state of science? That only works when the question is clear. Dan and you must be talking about very different things.
If this is only about incoherence and gibberish then I greatly applaud the decision to delete those comments, which were indeed thick on the ground in some recent threads, but the way Dan phrased his epistemic sadism entry looked as if the desired commenting behaviour was to fall into the Gish Galloper’s trap.
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Alex,
Massimo and I definitely both agree on the core kind of comment we call nonsense. There may be some things we disagree on, but regardless he and I will get this worked out.
If a comment gets through that you don’t find to make sense, just ignore it. If you want to respond to something, please keep the Epistemic sadism point in mind.
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Alex, I’m afraid I agree with Dan, demons are out too, even though they are not strictly speaking nonsensical. But I don’t see libertarian free will as quite on the same level as demons (and I hope you know that I don’t actuakly defend that position), so it would probably pass.
As for competence regarding science: since philosophers do not typically question the specific technical aspects of science (about which they do not, as you say, have expertise), but rather focus on higher level epistemological, metaphysical and ethical issues (in which they do have expertise, and scientists typically don’t), I don’t see the problem, broadly speaking. (Specifically speaking there are of course cases of philosophers talking nonsense about science; more than balanced by cases of scientists talking nonsense about philosophy…)
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Can we make a little distinction here between a philosopher telling a particular scientist that he or she has got something wrong and saying that scientists in general have got something wrong.
I think that if one were to go through and count the instances of scientists saying that philosophers, in general, have got something wrong about philosophy, and philosophers saying that scientists, in general, have got something wrong about science, I would wager that former would outweigh the latter heavily.
I would also say that these claims seem, to me at least, to be somewhat immune to evidence.
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I like this essay and agree with it for the most part. I also think the commentary here at Scientia is well above average for any sort of internet dialogue. I find Main Street a bit more intellectual than I thought. And that is regardless of whether I agree with the comments. So yes always aim higher but also be realistic.
I think one of the problems with internet comments regarding philosophical issues is that they often tap into larger fundamental differences beyond the focus of the particular essay. Questions like what it means to “know” something, what is “morality”, or “truth”, or “science,” etc.
These questions can come up on a variety of topics and although the questions are very interesting in themselves, and provide excellent topics for enriching discussions, they will tend to side track the more specific topic. It’s not that these discussions are off topic because the disagreements may in fact stem from these more fundamental differences in outlook.
When you are engaging Main Street you can’t assume that people will have similar understandings of these more fundamental concepts. And by fundamental I don’t mean “easy,” (they are often difficult) but rather ideas/concepts that will effect a person’s outlook on a large number of issues. So for example every time an essay is written on ethics are we going to re-argue about the merits of various meta-ethical views? Often that will have an effect on the person’s outlook but arguing the nuts and bolts, of major meta-ethical views is also going to be somewhat off topic and repetitive.
I’m not sure there is an easy solution. But perhaps consider a few (maybe like 5-10?) fundamental/definitional essays that those topics can be offloaded to. It would be on a strictly as needed basis. So if you find people keep disagreeing on what “truth” is or what “morality” is and these disagreements tend to sidetrack from the topic at hand, you could kick out an essay that explained the traditional view of knowledge or truth or science, or covered some of the basics on different meta-ethical positions. These articles could be left open for comments. You could still keep the same 5 post 500 word limit per person, but leave it open for new people to post on these half a dozen or so “fundamental” or “definitional” articles so we can get a sense of their views – if they want to share.
The advantage would be that these issues could be somewhat offloaded from the more particular issues raised in the various essays. Moreover, in reading those comments we might, avoid covering the same ground, fine tune where the differences are, and also get to know other posters better.
But again I am quite happy with this site and the quality of the discussion so I am not saying this is needed at this time.
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Hi Alex,
Not true as it happens. A normal database administrator or designer is not considered the measure of doing it right in terms of the correct design of a database, rather figures like Donald Chamberlain, Raymond Boyce and Edgar Codd are and their successors.
I know of no farmers who will tell the academics that they have no business telling them how to farm, instead they are often very keen to learn of the latest research from the “Ivory tower”.
As I have often said (and I know no reason why it will not again be ignored), the philosophy of science is not and has never been a matter of philosophers telling scientists that they are doing it wrong. Rather it is and has always been a collaboration between philosophers, mathematicians and scientists.
Now science does not just concern scientists, it concerns all of us, it informs all of us and we pay for it and elect the people who decide what gets funded and what does not.
It has never been more important for the “main street” to be informed about science and to be able to keep at bay the pseudo science which is continually pestering to be counted as science.
Individual scientists may think they have a handle on the big picture about science. Maybe they do. but how am I to know that?
So here I see a place for the philosophy of science, not just scientists, not just philosophers but, as I said before, a deep collaboration of scientists, philosophers and mathematicians.
When I can see that collaboration, see the results and hear from those involved in it then I have a better sense of having the big pictures rather than from individual scientists who claim to speak on behalf of science.
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The article posted defined philosophy in an extremely reductive and reduced way. Let me quote Dan:
“What is the method of philosophy?
As broadly speaking as possible, the method of (analytic) philosophy is clear argumentation and use of the tools that make an argument successful. Success, here, is the acquisition of true propositions and the rejection of false ones. Those tools that make an argument successful are critical thinking, logic, and other reasoning skills. Let’s include these all under the umbrella term of “critical thinking” for now.”
So Dan defines “philosophy” as “analytical” philosophy. I was not aware that some philosophers do not “analyze”. Or maybe Dan wants to speak about “analytic philosophy” as defined in the Anglosphere? Bertrand Russell launched it, and concluded that it was not worth engaging in, the way it had evolved.
Why?
The creation of philosophy requires an open mind. Those who restrict themselves at the outset, to the “acquisition of true propositions, and the rejection of false ones,” are, assuredly very different from Socrates, who claimed he did not know anything.
Socrates exaggerated: he knew something, how to tie his shoes. So what did Socrates mean?
Socrates meant that hard questions are better approached, not knowing whether they are true or false. When one can be, at the outset, sure whether a proposition is true or false, it may not be worth having.
Some use “logic”. “Logic” is an old friend of theirs. But they never heard of the Cat Paradox (A and Non A), or the failure of the Distributive Law of Logic in the Quantum World (I explained that in a comment that was rejected).
So it is not too clear what “logic” is: even in hard science and mathematics themselves, the axioms vary. Those who do not understand this can Google “Non Standard Analysis” or “Incompleteness Theorems”.
Before we know something, we have to guess what said thing could be. This is the most useful role of the philosophical method.
Great philosophers have long been aware of this. That is why they nearly all used what I would call the poetical method in philosophy.
In poetry, images are used, even when they do not reflect a logic one can make explicit.
This happens even in science. Newton needed some axioms to make his celestial mechanics work. He used them although he admitted they made no sense. Why? Because he had to.
Similarly with the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: it implies A and Non A. Or at least seems to (Einstein-Schrodinger Cat). Thus some of its fine features use, not “analysis”, but poetry. Dead and alive.
By rejecting the poetical method in philosophy, one rejects guessing. So doing philosophical exchanges become as simple as tying up each other’s shoes. Socrates will have to admit our great minds, those we have now, know it all.
Is that the examined life? Well, it’s the examined shoe’s life.
Most of historical philosophy, let alone thinking, gets excluded.
(Two previous comments rejected.).
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Philip Thrift,
“Just my suggestion: It would be better if both the essays and comments were shorter;”
What?! how can anyone say anything important in less than 500 words?! – All right, say, 485 words, min. – and ten words for notational links.
… but seriously, when Massimo announced the word-limit, it made me focus my arguments; but sometimes even focused arguments do take a couple hundred words.
Your remarks on Rorty do not seem to me off-topic. Although Rorty’s relativism does go too far, his prose evidenced a (at the time) much needed charity.
Robin Herbert,
“Not true as it happens. A normal database administrator or designer is not considered the measure of doing it right in terms of the correct design of a database (etc.).”
Excellent and well-worded comment.
Alex SL,
I must agree with other responses to your comments. It would be one thing if philosophers sat in judgment determining grants and publications for scientists; but the reality is that philosophers are merely asking general questions concerning larger issues that science raises. Scientists sometimes have legitimate claim to comment on such issues; but frequently they either do not comment on these issues, or remark on them without first reflecting on their histories or implications. And what are we to do with scientists clearly engaged in metaphysics (like Leonard Susskind) who deny the are doing this, or who claim to find the solution to ethical problems through (claimed) scientific extrapolation, like Sam Harris? One could, I suppose, make the ‘post-modern’ sociologist claim that they are engaged in some effort at ‘cultural hegemony;’ but it seems wiser (and fairer) to point out weaknesses in their reasoning, as philosophers are trained to do. Or better, in a preparatory and reflective manner, raise questions about epistemology, methodology (etc.), in more general ways that may offer insight on more general human practices even beyond what can science can do or tell us.
Coel,
One of the problems we each need to reflect on, is our impulse ‘to be right.’ As thinkers we each have personal histories of arriving at our positions in such a way that we are satisfied with them, we are convinced of their appropriateness and correctness. That’s all well and good, but easily engenders a sense that we must convince others of this appropriate rightness as well. This leads to unnecessary contention and misunderstandings. (I’m not ‘lecturing’ you, I continually struggle with this myself.) If anyone wants to clarify an issue of *language* they don’t need a response about the practice of science. If someone has a problem with an epistemological issue, assuring them empiricism answers all such questions is not going to persuade them. Perhaps there will not be a final persuasion, either way; perhaps the best we can hope for is to agree to disagree.
All,
‘Agree to disagree’ – perhaps that should be the slogan for the SS comments section. There is no decisive conclusion to any argument that can be reached in 500 word comments.
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Dan posted a useful analysis of bad reasoning and I supplemented this with a list of good practices for manner of conduct. But there is another way to look at the matter. Ostensible commentary is in the foreground but in the background there is another, implicit process, of signalling and role playing. More often than not, it is this background of signalling and role playing that causes the real problems.
It is helpful to identify these roles and ask whether they are useful. I have watched the many discussions with keen interest and isolated the following roles that people tend to play. No names, no packdrill, but I am sure you will easily name the role players. Not all roles are exclusive and people can fluidly embrace more than one role.
1. Provocateur.
Delights in provoking by making contentious, critical statements that challenge the ruling status quo.
2. Enforcer.
This person has a prescriptive view of truth and regards it as his duty to silence alternate views of truth. He knows the truth and it is incumbent on him to squash false views of truth.
3. Ideologue
He has a firm, unchallengeable ideological framework that is projected onto every discussion. Every discussion is seen as either a challenge to his framework or as supporting his framework. Other points of view are not entertained.
4. Combatant
He sees the discussion as a jousting tournament and is aggressively determined to win every argument. He can be depended upon to seek the last word in every interchange.
5. Contrarian
Whatever view is put forward he can be depended on to advance opposing points of view. He loves debating contrasting ideas. Every discussion needs a contrarian but it is hard to stay in the same room with him for long.
6. Poseur
He is determined to impress with his erudition and will make comments replete with academic references to all manner of obscure figures. The rest of us poor dilettantes have no idea what he is talking about.
7. Academic
He plays a teaching role, bringing a deep background of knowledge, skill and insight to the discussion. He is occasionally irascible as he loses patience with deliberately obtuse students. That is because he tends to see the discussion as an extension of his lecture room.
8. Dilettante
The dabbler has an amateur interest in the subject but, more often than not, is not aware of his limitations.
9. Explorer
Sees the essays and discussion as an opportunity to learn. He is prepared to entertain other viewpoints and is looking to expand his worldview.
10. Contributor
Believes he has something useful to say and sincerely tries to enrich the conversation with his insights.
We do not just comment, we engage in signalling and role playing, whether or not we are aware of it. We should all examine ourselves and ask what roles we play. Are these useful and admirable roles? Look at the comments others make and identify their role playing. How do you think others will judge you?
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Hi Massimo,
Agreed, and the phrase “two-way conversation” is the key. So suppose, to take an example, a philosopher says:
“In science, all explanations are causal.”
And a scientist replies:
“Well, actually, since quantum mechanics we’ve accepted that it may be that some events are not `caused’ and thus we’re happy to consider the possibility of non-causal explanations”,
to which a philosopher replies:
“No, you’re wrong, in science all explanations are causal, look it up in SEP”.
In that case that philosopher is after a one-way conversation, and shouldn’t complain if the scientist responds by querying the philosopher’s credentials to pronounce on the issue.
Hi Dan,
The implication there is that it is philosophers who get to decide what an explanation “is”, and that if scientists don’t agree then they’re doing it wrong.
However, scientists do not see philosophers as the authority on such things, instead scientists see nature as the authority. Scientists see science as about adapting ideas to conform to nature, not about conforming to philosophical notions of how science should be.
Thus, if physicists adopt an idea because they think it better models nature, then they simply won’t care if philosophers regard it as wrong. That applies to notions of causality, it also applies to notions like the multiverse, and to ideas that physical constants might be locally contingent accidents, et cetera.
Philosophers are welcome to engage in a two-way conversation on such things, and likely they’d have a lot to contribute that way. But attempting a one-way conversation will likely amount to consigning themselves to irrelevance.
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Yaryaryar wrote:
“…More broadly, I don’t think argumentation is all it is cracked up to be.
“I think painting alternatives in broad brush strokes (even without argumentation) is a useful tool that allows others the opportunity to catch a glimpse of a different reality.”
I have a lot of sympathy with this. In my view, philosophical progress comes not so much from accepting true propositions as from coming to see things in a different way. Bringing someone around to a new way of seeing and thinking is not the sort of thing that’s likely to be achieved in a blog comment. It’s more likely to occur over an extended period of a time, with prolonged reflection. The best we’re likely to do in a blog comment is give someone a little prod in the right direction. Of course, more superficial errors may be revealed by quick arguments. I’m talking here about deeper philosophical differences.
I would add that “argument” and “argumentation” are pretty fuzzy concepts. Once we get away from purely deductive arguments (as we mostly should) the distinction between argument and explanation becomes fuzzy. If we think in terms of inference to the best explanation, then arguing consists in helping the reader see why the explanation is a good one. If we come across a good enough explanation, we may see its merit without the need for additional argument. In a sense, a good explanation argues for itself.
Non-deductive inference requires non-formulaic judgements. There is no complete formula to be followed in making such judgements, no argument that gets us all the way from premises or evidence to a conclusion. Non-deductive arguments can be seen as giving us prods in the (hopefully) right direction, helping our non-conscious cognitive processes to make better judgements. But if we have the wrong way of looking at things, we’re probably not going to make good judgements on that subject, regardless of the arguments.
We tend to think of rational belief as being based on arguments. I would say, rather, that rational belief is based primarily on good intuitive judgement, i.e. the effective operation of our non-conscious cognitive processes, and sometimes supplemented by verbal reasoning. (We can’t reason about everything, including our transient beliefs about what’s currently going on around us.) Sometimes reasoning occurs on the way to forming a belief, but it often occurs only after a belief has been formed by intuitive judgement. Such post-hoc critical scrutiny is unfortunately liable to slip into ego-serving justification. Even when we’re committed to serious self-scrutiny, we are liable to see such scrutiny as consisting mainly in checking whether we can find a supporting argument. That contributes to the over-emphasis on arguments, blurs the distinction between justification and scrutiny, and can also lead to such misguided worries as the problem of induction, as we feel we need justificatory arguments for everything.
When I talk about the right way of looking at things in the context of philosophy, what I have in mind, broadly speaking, is a Wittgensteinian view of language combined with a more “naturalised” way of thinking about the substantive issues, including a more “naturalised” epistemology.
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Let X↛Y stand for X contradicts|criticizes|corrects Y. Then there are the four types of interaction (where P=philosopher, S=scientist): S↛P, P↛S, S↛S, P↛P. It seems to me that there is enough to balance it all out.
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A very nice essay and a lot of good suggestions. Reading this and the unfolding interesting discussion in the comment section I am more than ever convinced of the strengths of this forum and quite optimistic that implementing these guidelines will even further increase comment quality.
It seems to me that the chosen examples are intentionally assembled to pick a bit on Coel, but he has shown time an time again that he is a “good sport” about this type of criticism and I would like to commend him for that!
Also, Aravis and Labnut have shown in this thread an elsewhere that their perspectives are valuable and needed and I for one hope that both stay or at least come back regularly!
Finally, I would like to say in response to Robin Herbert that some farmers – in my experience – do not listen to the agricultural scientist. I actually find it quite ironic that in many fields of application there is a similar tension between “scientists” and “practitioners” and even baffling that it’s theoretical physicists of all people who take the skeptical role of “practitioners” and lament on the “ivory tower” mentality of philosophers of science in these discourses.
When I venture out of my own ivory tower and dare to harass practitioners with esoteric mathematical tools then I sometimes find myself in a similarly defensive position, as do some philosophers when criticized by “scientists”. Maybe that’s also why I side with the philosophers’ sentiments, more often than not.
Coel said in another thread that mother nature – and not the physicist – is the ultimate judge when deciding on the accuracy of physical theories. This might be, but at least she doesn’t constantly whine about the limited use of most theoretical models of physics nor does she throw around allegations of preposterousness whenever a group of mere human beings team up to modestly try to study her. Who knows, maybe theoretical physicists might connect better with philosophers of science if it were otherwise.
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Just one observation- interestingly I think that the tensions between scientists and philosophers arises mostly between physicists and philosophers, but not as many other types of scientists and philosophers.
I am sure Massimo can elaborate on this, but various types of biologists collaborate very effectively with philosophers on questions like whether or not there are biological laws, what the units of selection are, etc. Additionally, philosophers of mind are well received in the cognitive science field- see all the co-authored papers between prominent philosophers of mind (dennett, block, prinz, wu, etc), prominent neural scientists(dehaene, lau, koudier, etc).
Just a thought.
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