Strong Artificial Intelligence

by Massimo Pigliucci Here is a Scientia Salon video chat between Dan Kaufman and Massimo Pigliucci, this time focusing on the issues surrounding the so-called "strong" program in Artificial Intelligence. Much territory that should be familiar to regular readers is covered, hopefully, however, with enough twists to generate new discussion. We introduce the basic strong AI thesis about … Continue reading Strong Artificial Intelligence

Jesse Prinz on concepts, part II

by Dan Tippens This is Part II of an interview with Professor Jesse Prinz of City University of New York. In this video, Dan Tippens first asks Prinz about his Proxytype theory of concepts. Dan then raises an objection to Prinz's view; that Proxytype theory might have a problem satisfying the requirement that concepts be … Continue reading Jesse Prinz on concepts, part II

Jesse Prinz on concepts, part I

by Dan Tippens This is Part I of an interview with Professor Jesse Prinz of City University of New York. In this video, our assistant editor Dan Tippens asks Professor Prinz about his book "Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis." First, Dan asks Prinz what the desiderata of a theory of concepts are. … Continue reading Jesse Prinz on concepts, part I

Ned Block on phenomenal consciousness, part II

by Dan Tippens Our Assistant Editor, Daniel Tippens, asks Professor Ned Block, of New York University, about his work on the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. This is part II of that interview, you can find Part I here. SciSal: Something I remember I was thinking about a lot is some of the … Continue reading Ned Block on phenomenal consciousness, part II

Ned Block on phenomenal consciousness, part I

by Dan Tippens Our Assistant Editor, Daniel Tippens, asks Professor Ned Block, of New York University, about his work on the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. This is part I of that interview, we will publish part II later this week. SciSal: I first wanted to start with an introduction to the concept … Continue reading Ned Block on phenomenal consciousness, part I

Free Will, the Basics

by Massimo Pigliucci [This essay is part of a special “free will week” at Scientia Salon. The Editor promises not to touch the topic again for a long while after this particular orgy, of course assuming he has any choice in the matter...] Sometimes it’s good, or even necessary, to go back to the basics. … Continue reading Free Will, the Basics

The intuitional problem of consciousness

by Mark O’Brien Could a computer ever be conscious? I think so, at least in principle. Scientia Salon has seen a number of very interesting discussions on this theme which unfortunately have failed to shift anybody’s position [1]. That much is to be expected. The problem is that the two sides seem to be talking … Continue reading The intuitional problem of consciousness

Is quantum mechanics relevant to the philosophy of mind (and the other way around)?

by Quentin Ruyant There have been speculations on a possible link between quantum mechanics and the mind almost since the early elaboration of quantum theory (including by well known physicists, such as Wigner, Bohr and Pauli). Yet despite a few proposals (e.g. from Stapp, Penrose, Eccles [1]) what we could dub “quantum mind hypothesis” are … Continue reading Is quantum mechanics relevant to the philosophy of mind (and the other way around)?

The Turing test doesn’t matter

by Massimo Pigliucci You probably heard the news: a supercomputer has become sentient and has passed the Turing test (i.e., has managed to fool a human being into thinking he was talking to another human being [1,2])! Surely the Singularity is around the corner and humanity is either doomed or will soon become god-like. Except, … Continue reading The Turing test doesn’t matter

Plato and the proper explanation of our actions

by Rebecca Goldstein [1] PLATO: The disagreement between you reminds me of an argument I heard a long time ago. SHOKET: Well, if it was so long ago I don’t see why it would have any relevance to what we’ve been talking about. We’re talking about our state of knowledge now, not a long time … Continue reading Plato and the proper explanation of our actions