Reductionism, emergence, and burden of proof — part II

by Marko Vojinovic In part I of this essay I have introduced and discussed the idea of reductionism from an epistemological point of view. In what follows we will go one step further, and discuss the idea of ontological reductionism [15]. However, much of what follows will be actually devoted to rewriting the discussion of … Continue reading Reductionism, emergence, and burden of proof — part II

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Reductionism, emergence, and burden of proof — part I

by Marko Vojinovic Introduction Every now and then, the question of reductionism is raised in philosophy of science: whether or not various sciences can be theoretically reduced to lower-level sciences. The answer to this question can have far-reaching consequences for our understanding of science both as a human activity and as our vehicle to gain … Continue reading Reductionism, emergence, and burden of proof — part I

On the (dis)unity of the sciences

by Massimo Pigliucci As a practicing scientist I have always assumed that there is one thing, one type of activity, we call science. More importantly, though I am a biologist, I automatically accepted the physicists’ idea that — in principle at the least — everything boils down to physics, that it makes perfect sense to … Continue reading On the (dis)unity of the sciences