by Dan Tippens
This is Part II of an interview with Professor Jesse Prinz of City University of New York. In this video, Dan Tippens first asks Prinz about his Proxytype theory of concepts. Dan then raises an objection to Prinz’s view; that Proxytype theory might have a problem satisfying the requirement that concepts be capable of being publicly shared. Afterward, Prinz explains how an empiricist would be able to account for abstract concepts which don’t obviously have any perceivable features such as the concept “truth” of “justice.” Dan subsequently questions whether we should be committed to a strong form of empiricism or if we ought to adopt a more moderate account. The interview closes with Dan asking Prinz to explain how the neo-empiricist accounts for the phenomenon of “inner speech” given that inner speech has some distinctive representational differences from auditory perception (which seems to be the modality from which inner speech would be derived). (Thanks to Luke Rodgers for his assistance with the editing of this video.)
[We apologize for the not ideal quality of the audio. However, your experience will be significantly augmented by the use of standard earphones.]
Daniel Tippens is a research technician at New York University School of Medicine. He is also an assistant editor for the webzine Scientia Salon.
Jesse J. Prinz is a Distinguished Professor of philosophy and director of the Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. He works primarily in the philosophy of psychology and ethics and has authored several books and over 100 articles, addressing such topics as emotion, moral psychology, aesthetics and consciousness. Much of his work in these areas has been a defense of empiricism against psychological nativism, and he situates his work as in the naturalistic tradition of philosophy associated with David Hume. Prinz is also an advocate of experimental philosophy.